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From ‘Diaspora by Design’ to Transnational Political Exile: The Gülen
Movement in Transition 
In the wake of the July 2016 putsch and the subsequent purge of followers of the 
outlawed Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen in every sphere of Turkish life under the
ruling AKP government’s state of emergency, the Gülen movement (GM) is in 
disarray and crisis. A fruitful way to bring some analytical order to this issue is 
through the frame of diaspora, which we contend provides some useful analytical 
purchase on understanding the movement historically and in transition. The GM 
as it stood prior to 2016 is, we contend, best conceived as a transnational 
parapolitical network—a ‘diaspora by design’—dedicated principally to the 
service, not of humanity, but of power. Based on interviews with over 70 key 
members of the movement conducted between 2012 and 2018, we show how, 
from the late 1990s Gülen and his supporters crafted a complex transnational 
structure that has combined extensive financial operations with a distinctive 
organizational morphology. We map out the contours of this structure and show 
how it emerged over time via instrumentalization of Gülen’s parapolitical 
ideology and the steady accretion of politically-directed, corporate projects 
outside Turkey. Finally, drawing again on the notion of diaspora the we offer a 
framework for thinking about how the movement may evolve in future as it 
transitions to a fragmented community in transnational in political exile.
Keywords: Turkey; Gülen movement; parapolitics; diaspora; transnational social 
movements; political exile
(1) Introduction
In  the  wake of  the  July 2016 putsch and the  subsequent  purge  of  followers  of  the
outlawed  Turkish cleric,  Fethullah  Gülen  in  every  sphere  of  Turkish  life  under  the
ruling AKP government’s state of emergency, the Gülen movement (GM) is in disarray
and crisis. A fruitful way to bring some analytical order to this issue is through the
frame  of  diaspora,  which  we  contend  provides  some  useful  analytical  purchase  on
understanding the movement historically and in transition. The overarching theme of
the article is that the GM outside turkey is in transition from a ‘diaspora by design’ to a
dispersed and fractured community in transnational political exile. 
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More concretely, the principal claim we advance in this article is that the Gülen
movement as it existed prior to 2016 is best conceived as a transnational parapolitical
network1 dedicated  not  to  the service of  humanity—as  the GM’s favoured term for
itself,  Hizmet, implies—but to the service of power; namely, that of Fethullah Gülen.
We suggest that, over the course of three decades, Gülen and his most senior acolytes
‘mobilized transnational space’2 to craft a unique, parapolitical organizational structure
that  combined a  distinctive  institutional  morphology and dense network of financial
operations, the elements of which have worked synergistically to further Gülen’s pursuit
of power. We map out the contours of this structure as it existed prior to 2016 and show
how it emerged over time via instrumentalization of Gülen’s parapolitical ideology and
the steady accretion of politically-directed educational, media and publishing, and other
corporate projects outside Turkey. 
While  this  structure  has  been  dramatically  reshaped—and  substantially
weakened—after July 2016 much of it remains in place abroad, especially in Western
countries  such  as  Australia,  Sweden,  the  UK and  the  United  States.  The  pre-coup
structure of the movement is thus worth laying out in detail, not least because coming to
grips with where the movement is headed needs a clear understanding of where it has
come from.
Our  research  is  based  on  extensive  fieldwork  and  close  empirical  research,
especially  in  the  sensitive  post-2013 period  in  which  the  AKP–GM split  burst  into
1  The concept of ‘parapolitics’ we use here serves as a useful way to frame the movement’s
well-known aversion to transparency and penchant  for evasion.  According to Peter  Dale
Scott, a seminal figure in the field of parapolitical studies, a parapolitical organization is one
that  engages  in  a  ‘practice  of  politics’:  1)  ‘in  which  accountability  is  consciously
diminished’; 2) in which political action is ‘covert’ (i.e. based on ‘indirection, collusion, and
deceit’ and that; 3) typically involves ‘political exploitation of […] parastructures, such as
intelligence agencies’ or other coercive arms of the state.’ See Peter Dale Scott,  The War
Conspiracy:  JFK,  9/11,  and  the  Deep  Politics  of  War (Ipswich,  MA:  Mary  Ferrell
Foundation Press, 2008), p. 238. Hendrick’s notion of ‘strategic ambiguity’  and Angey’s
related  concept  of  ‘ambiguous  identification’  have  emerged  as  analogous  frames  for
understanding the discursive and instrumental  practices that  the GM adopts ‘to persuade
outsiders that stated objectives correspond with observable outcomes’, as well as ‘plausible
deniability’ and to maintain ‘a certain level of non-transparency’ Joshua Hendrick,  Gülen:
The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World (New York: New York
University Press, 2013), p. 58. See also Gabrielle Angey,  ‘The Gülen Movement and the
transfer  of  a  political  conflict  from  Turkey  to  Senegal’,  Politics,  Religion  &  Ideology
(forthcoming). 
2  Martin Sökefeld, “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the
Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks 6, no. 3 (2006): 265–284.
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public view. It builds on recent media reporting as well as the fieldwork of the authors,
conducted  over  the  past  five  years  in  Western  Europe,  the  Balkans,  Turkey  and
Southeast Asia, in the form of semi-structured interviews with over seventy members of
the movement. Because of the parapolitical nature of the organization, its structure can
only  be  accurately  sketched  from  data  drawn  directly  from  those  within  it.  Strict
confidentiality was offered to the interviewees, most of whom agreed to participate only
on condition of anonymity. In lieu of audio recordings, the interviews were transcribed
with  detailed  written  notes.  For  this  reason,  the  validity  of  the  collected  data  is
increased, albeit at some unavoidable cost in transparency. 
Additionally, we have sought to enhance validity by adopting multi-sited data
triangulation  as  a  validation  strategy.  ‘Triangulation  of  data’  as  Flick  observes,
‘combines data drawn from different sources and at different times, in different places
or  from different  people.’3 Interviews  were  conducted  with  79  individuals  between
February 2012 and June 2017 across 11 countries (Turkey, the United Kingdom, Spain,
Italy,  Germany,  Austria,  Slovenia,  Serbia,  Cambodia,  Thailand,  and  Sweden).  The
spread of interviews conducted covers the broadest possible range of actors within the
movement and includes 11 students within the  dershane [education centre] network.4
Table  1  presents  the  summary  breakdown  of  these  interviews.  In  addition  to
triangulation across individual sources we triangulated primary data with a variety of
secondary sources, including existing studies of the movement, news reports and other
materials. 
[Table 1 about here]
The article proceeds as follows. It  begins with a brief review of the existing
literature  on  diasporas,  focusing  particularly  on  Martin  Sökefeld’s  understanding  of
diaspora as an ‘imagined transnational community’ and his suggestion to draw on the
3  Uwe Flick, ‘Triangulation in qualitative research’, in A Companion to Qualitative Research,
ed. Uwe Flick, Ernst von Kardorff, and Ines Steinke (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage
Publications, 2004), p. 178.
4  It is worth emphasizing this point in particular. David Tittensor has rightly noted that the
‘missing  link’  in  empirical  work  on  the  movement  has  been  the  incorporation  of  the
perspective of dershane students. David Tittensor, ‘The Gülen Movement and the Case of a
Secret Agenda: Putting the Debate in Perspective’,  Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations
23, no. 2 (2012): 170–71.
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insights of social  movement theory in theorizing diasporic formation.5 In the second
part, we show how Gülen and his senior acolytes mobilized in transnational space to
construct their parapolitical ‘diaspora by design’. We detail the GM’s deft navigation of
the opportunity structures that opened up for Turkish Muslim business after the end of
the Cold War and after the September 11 terrorist attacks, by instrumentalizing Gülen’s
parapolitical ideology to craft a complex transnational expatriate structure through the
steady accretion of politically-directed corporate projects around the world. We then
present  out  analysis  of the overarching organizational  structure of the network as it
existed up to July 2016, based on its three key elements: (1) a ‘control centre’ based on
Gülen and the Grand Council of Elders (still largely intact); (2), the civic face of the
movement (mostly intact outside Turkey, dismantled at home), and its ‘dark networks’
of influence in political  circles and in the state structure (now  largely extricated in
waves of purges since July 2016). Finally, we offer a framework for thinking about how
the  movement  may  evolve  in  future  as  it  transitions  to  a  fragmented  transnational
community in political exile. 
Diaspora formation: Lessons from social movement theory
In his 1992 book  Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the
New Global Economy, Joel Kotkin coined the term ‘diaspora by design’ to describe the
transnational  network  of  trading  companies  and  businesses  constructed  by Japanese
expatriate  professionals  in  the  interwar  period.6 These  managers  leveraged  the
tremendous  human  and financial  capital  built  up  in  Japan in  the  wake  of  its  rapid
modernization and industrialization to venture overseas in search of new markets and
opportunities. By drawing on Kotkin’s moniker here to describe the Gülen movement,
we seek to  highlight  the opportunity structure presented by contemporary neoliberal
globalization  for  the  movement  and  its  underlying  strength  as  an  economically
successful diaspora, which was—at its peak—worth, according to some accounts,  as
much as US$25 billion globally.7 The parallels are instructive for the three features most
commonly  associated  with  the  movement—a  cohesive  collective  identity,  an
5  Sökefeld, op. cit.
6  Joel Kotkin,  Tribes: how race, religion and identity determine success in the new global
economy (New York: Random House, 1992).
7  Burhan Gurdogan, ‘Religious movements in Turkey’, OpenDemocracy, 20 December 2010,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/burhan-gurdogan/religious-movements-in-turkey
5
advantageous occupational profile, and motivation to acquire education and knowledge
—are  the  same  three  that,  as  Kotkin  notes,  predict  whether  a  mobilized  economic
diaspora is likely to succeed.8
The concept of diaspora, while not essentially contested in the strong sense, is
certainly highly contested both intellectually  and politically.9 Rather  than revisit  the
debate here, we follow Brubaker’s emphasis on the ‘three core elements that remain
widely understood to be constitutive of diaspora.’10 These are:  ‘dispersion in space’,
‘orientation to a homeland’ and ‘boundary maintenance’.11 Moreover, we take up the
suggestion of Brubaker and others that diasporas are best not thought of as not merely
as concrete entities but also as communities of practice whose collective identity is not
natural  or  given  but  constructed  via  mobilization—in  Sökefeld’s  terms,  imagined
transnational communities.12
In reflecting on the core ideas of mobilization of collective identity in this way
Sökefeld points to insights from social movement theory in helping us make sense of
diasporic formation.  In particular  he draws our attention to the three key theoretical
elements that have grounded research in the field: opportunity structures, mobilizing
structures, and ideational frames. Opportunity structures refer to the set of opportunities
(and constraints) confronting collective action that shape actors’ ‘choice set’ in taking
action  to  achieve  objectives.  Mobilizing  structures  are  the  common  institutions  or
practices  that  the transnational  community deploys  to  conscript  resources,  exchange
information  and coordinate  collective  action.  Finally,  frames  are ‘specific  ideas  that
fashion a shared understanding […] by rendering events and conditions meaningful […
8  Kotkin, op. cit.
9  See William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies:  Myths  of Homeland and Return,”
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1, no. 1 (1991): 83–99. Rogers Brubaker, “The
‘diaspora’  Diaspora,”  Ethnic  and  Racial  Studies  28,  no.  1  (2005):  1–19,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997.  Robin  Cohen,  Global  Diasporas:  An
Introduction, 2nd ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).
10  Brubaker, op. cit.
11  This last concept refers to 'the processes whereby group solidarity is mobilized and retained,
even accepting that there are counter processes of boundary erosion’. It is this that ‘enables
one to speak of a diaspora as a distinct “community”, held together by a distinctive, active
solidarity, as well as by relatively dense social relationships that cut across state boundaries
and link members of the diaspora into a single “transnational community”.’ Brubaker, op.
cit., p. 6.
12  Sökefeld, op. cit.
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through] a common framework of interpretation and representation.13 
(2) Mobilization in transnational space: opportunity, ideology, practices
Opportunity
Over  the  decades,  the  GM  expanded—seemingly  exponentially—the  number  and
influence  of  its  affiliated  schools,  companies  and  trade  associations,  media  and
publishing holdings,  and cultural  centres  dedicated  to  inter-faith  dialogue across the
world, seizing the opportunities offered by neo-liberal globalization and the yearning in
the  West  for  a  model  of  ‘moderate’  Islam  compatible  with  both  capitalist  market
economics and liberal democracy. According to one count at its peak there were around
300 affiliated schools in Turkey and over 1,000 of them in as many as 160 countries
across  the  globe,  including  120 charter  schools  in  the United  States.  By 2008,  The
Economist would proclaim that the GM was ‘vying to be recognized as the world’s
leading Muslim network’.14 
The movement’s success abroad has rested, in the first instance, on its capacity
to deftly navigate—from the 1980s through to the early 2000s—three distinct political
opportunity structures. The first of these, as many scholars have noted, was the policy of
neoliberal restructuring in Turkey under the leadership of Turgut Özal (prime minister,
1983–89, president, 1989–93). This allowed Gülenists to build much needed human and
financial  capital.  Leveraging this  resource,  the  movement  then  used  the opportunity
presented by the end of the cold war and Özal’s foreign policy orientation towards the
Turkic-speaking, former Soviet Central  Asian republics to mobilize for transnational
network expansion. Finally, the movement was able to take advantage of the desire for
‘good’  Islam  in  the  West  after  the  September  11  terrorist  attacks.  With  its  public
emphasis  on  ‘liberal’  Islam,  interfaith  dialogue,  and  the  importance  of  rational
knowledge and modern science, the movement was able to effectively place itself on the
‘right’ side of what Mahmood Mamdani has termed the ‘culture talk’ in the West that
bifurcated the Islamic World into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims.15
13  Ibid., 269–270.
14  ‘How  far  they  have  travelled’,  The  Economist,  6  March  2008,
https://www.economist.com/node/10808408
15  Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and
Terrorism.” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 766–75. This point is also made by
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Ideology
The  transnational  collective  mobilization  of  the  Gülen  movement  from  the  1990s
onwards cannot be understood outside the set of complex ideational frames—grounded
in a distinct synthesis of Ottoman-Turkish nationalist and Islamic thought—deployed by
Gülen to propel the movement abroad. Gülen’s ideology is central to our understanding
of  it  as  a  parapolitical  organization.  To  review,  according  to  Scott  a  parapolitical
organization is a ‘system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously
diminished.’16 According  to  Scott,  parapolitics  are  a  manifestation  of  deep  and
complicated politics in which all political activities, arrangements and aims–deliberate
or  otherwise–are  hidden,  rather  than  acknowledged.  Moreover,  each  element  of  a
parapolitical organization serves political aims, either directly or indirectly.17 
The  movement’s  ideology  and  worldview,  is  inextricably  linked  to  the  life
experience of Fethullah Gülen himself. To begin, the apparent extraordinary personal
charisma of Fethullah Gülen himself bears noting. As Joshua Hendrick has observed,
‘the  Hocaefendi’s  ability  to  wield  social  power  amazes.’18 He  is  revered  by  his
followers, whom outsiders frequently (and often disparagingly) refer to as  Fettullahcı
(disciples of Fethullah), although members themselves do not use this term. Instead, his
‘followers refer to him as hocaefendi (roughly “master teacher”), in contrast both to the
ulema, experts in religious studies, and to şeyhs, masters of sufi brotherhoods.’19 At the
same time, it is clear that he is perceived as a teacher and orator of extraordinary gifts,
with  tremendous  passion,  gravitas  and  wisdom.  As  Hendrick20 notes,  from  the
beginning,  his  capacity to link intellectually ‘an applied understanding of [religious]
teachings  with the challenges  of late-industrial  Turkey’  has  been a prime source of
recruitment and mobilization.
Caroline Tee,  ‘The Gülen Movement  in London and the Politics of  Public Engagement:
Producing  “Good  Islam”  Before  and  After  July  15th’,  Politics,  Religion  &  Ideology
(forthcoming),  and David Tittensor,  ‘The Gülen Movement and Surviving in Exile: The
Case of Australia’, Politics, Religion & Ideology (forthcoming)
16  Scott, op. cit., p. 238.
17  Ibid.
18   Hendrick op cit., 4.
19  Carter Vaughn Findley,  Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010), 386.
20  Hendrick, op cit., 3.
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Gülen’s ideological  outlook can usefully be thought of as a product of three
distinct influences, the first of which is Islam, and in particular the biography of the
Prophet  Mohammed  and  his  followers.21 As  Hendrick  notes,  ‘Gülen  equates  the
significance and necessity of the coming generation with the first generation of Muslims
that emerged following Muhammed’s ministry in seventh-century Arabia (al-salaf).’22
Gülen’s reading of the life of the Prophet and other Islamic teachings in the modernist
tradition have been central to his articulation of a ‘theology of action’. Aksyion [action]
is  a  leitmotif  in  all  his  teachings,  which  as  Yavuz notes,  emphasizes  ‘control  over
material conditions as a way of enhancing spiritual needs and ends.’ Yavuz observes,
further, that Fethullah Gülen has always cast ‘himself as a contemporary man of praxis,
as well as of spiritual contemplation.’23 His followers, who follow his example closely,
draw on this in their own lives.
The second formative influence on Gülen’s ideology is the socio-cultural milieu
of his formative years in his native province of Erzurum in eastern Turkey,  and the
particular brand of chauvinistic Turkish statist–nationalism that characterizes the region.
As Yavuz notes: 
The dominant culture in the region is state-centric, and the people of the region, 
known by their regional identity as Dadaş, traditionally have given the state 
priority over religion […] Gülen’s conception of Islam is conditioned by this 
nationalism and statism.24
‘Gülen’ as Yavuz further observes, ‘is first and foremost a Turko-Ottoman nationalist’.25
Of course, now that he has become ‘public enemy number one’ in Turkey, it is easy
enough  to  forget  that  inculcating  a  fierce  national  pride  among  his  followers  and
advancing a vision of Turkey as a great power abroad have been central  to Gülen’s
message.  As Hendrick notes,  the ideology of the Gülen movement  [has been] more
focused on glorifying Turkey than […] on spreading Islam.’26
21  Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, pp. 211, 173.
22  Hendrick, 2013: 107.
23  Hakan Yavuz,  Toward an  Islamic  Enlightenment:  The  Gülen  Movement (Oxford;  New
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 33.
24  Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, p.181
25  Ibid.
26  Hendrick, op. cit., p. 241.
9
 The  third,  and  arguably  most  crucial,  influence  on  Gülenist  ideology  is
undoubtedly the legacy of Gülen’s links with Said Nursi (1876–1960), the author of a
three-volume exegesis  on the  Qur’an known as  The Epistles  of  Light  (Risale-i  Nur
Külliyat, RNK), and the founder of the most prominent text-based Islamic movement in
Turkey, commonly referred to in Turkey as the  Nurcu. Nursi’s legacy is critical in at
least two respects, both of which relate to the mobilizing institutions and practices of the
movement, to which we now turn. 
Practices
We can identify five distinct institutions and practices within the movement that have
been  central  to  its  transnational  mobilization:  institutionalized  sohbetler [reading
groups],  the practices  of  hizmet [service]  and  hicret [religiously-inspired migration],
collectively developed eserler [projects], and himmet [voluntary donations]. Let us take
each in turn.
Networking, fund-raising and planning: The institution of sohbetler 
At the heart of the Gülen movement are the regular sohbetler or reading groups, where
cemaat gather to discuss Gülen’s teachings. However, beyond this the sohbetler act as
central  hubs  for  ‘fund-raising,  organizational  planning,  and  social  networking  […]
linking individuals in Istanbul and London, Baku and Bangkok, New York and New
Delhi,  Buenos Aires and Timbuktu in a shared ritual of reading, socializing,  money
transfer, and [intra-community] communication exchange.’27
The  sohbetler are  outgrowths  of  the  highly-ritualized,  underground  group
meeting culture of the followers of Said Nursi, as mentioned a forerunner of Gülen’s
movement. Gülen adopted Nursi’s commitment to mobilization via ‘secretive solidarity
network’,28 eschewing ‘active’ politics and avoiding the gaze of an overbearing Turkish
state. Gülen and his movement, like Nursi before him, were—at least prior to 2002—
sceptical of publicly-visible political activism and ‘criticized [other] Nurcu intellectuals
[…] for their deep engagement in politics’.29 Such a posture contrasts dramatically with
27  Hendrick, op. cit., p. 116.
28  Ibid., 155.
29  Ibid., 183.
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the ‘actively political’ ethos of the public branch of Turkish Islam—the Milli Görüs—
from which the ruling AKP was born. While for Nursi  this ideological commitment
meant  being  entirely  ‘non-political’,  for  Gülen  it  has  translated  into  parapolitical
activity. Hendrick claims that the GM should be seen as ‘passively political’, but our
claim is  that  the  notion  of  ‘parapolitical’  is  far  more  accurate.  For  us,  the  idea  of
‘parapolitical’  ideology  and  strategy  closely  reflect  Hendrick’s  notion  of  ‘strategic
ambiguity’ and Angey’s notion of ‘ambiguous identification’, while providing slightly
more analytical and empirical coverage.30 
Becoming expatriates: the role of hizmet and hicret
Hizmet or service is a core practice within the core loyal following of Fethullah Gülen
[the cemaat] and represents an individual’s responsibility to pious aksyion in the service
of  God,  for  the  sake  of  mankind.  Cemaat  followers  have  typically  pursued  hizmet
through hicret [religiously-inspired migration]. 31 In the context of the movement, this
means  contributing  to  GM-inspired  projects—principally  schools—overseas.  In  this
regard, there are parallels  with the transnational aspects of Mormonism, namely,  the
commitment of the members of the LDS Church to perform missionary work abroad in
the service of the glory of God.32 
Project-based, transnational corporate expansion through eserler
Third, the practice of bringing to fruition Gülen-inspired initiatives or projects [eserler],
predominantly schools, but also other commercial media, publishing and manufacturing
enterprises.  Indeed,  eserler have  been  central  to  the  expansion  of  the  movement
historically in Turkey in the 1980s and transnationally from the mid 1990s. The model
of  continuous  expansion  via  eserler  was  laid  down  in  Turkey  in  1976,  with  the
establishment  of  the  Akyazılı  Foundation  for  Middle  and  Higher  Education,  the
30  Hendrick, op. cit, p. 32 ff. Angey, op. cit.
31  Hicret is Turkish word for the Arabic term hirja—the migration of the Prophet Mohammed
and his  followers  to  Medina in 622AD—an event  marking the beginning of the  Islamic
calendar.  The followers  of  Gulen  see  themselves  as  the  heirs  of  the  companions  of  the
Prophet who emigrated with Muhammad to Medina, at great sacrifice to themselves.
32  On this, see Melvyn Hammarberg,  The Mormon Quest for Glory: The Religious World of
the Latter-Day Saints (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 197–224.
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‘original  GM institution’.33 Each  project  eventually  begot  a  new  one,  prompting  a
virtuous circle as the profits from each were driven back into the network via profits
leading to even greater contributions and investments in yet new eserler, and on and on.
From  the  mid-1990s,  the  movement  replicated  this  model  abroad,  expanding  its
footprint globally, first (tentatively) into Western Europe (through dialogue centres in
the Netherlands and Germany)  and then into Central  Asia (via  the establishment  of
schools).34 The GM later moved into Russia, Australia, Southeast Asia and Africa.35 
As will be discussed in further detail below, the organization until the 2016 coup
had kept a clear control over this network via management committees or boards of
trustees [mütevelli heyeti] who, with guidance and advance from Gülen himself, would
decide about how the movement would pursue its next project:
The people that we call trustees are the ones who run the regions that they are in 
charge. They have a certain commitment to hizmet and do their prayers in full. 
They try to provide whatever is needed in their areas in material and spiritual.36
Over  forty  years,  these  eserler have  numbered  in  the  thousands,  have  crossed
international borders and have involved tremendous investment both in terms of human
and financial capital, thus allowing the organization to evolve, essentially by accretion,
into a corporate behemoth. 
The establishment of Bank Asya (BA), an Islamic (i.e. interest-free) financial
institution that began with start-up capital from sixteen businessmen loyal to Gülen in
1996, exemplifies this process of project-based expansion. BA—now taken over by the
Turkish  state—was  one  of  the  most  significant  eser the  GM  had  ever  initiated,
underpinning its dramatic growth in first decade and a half of the twenty-first century.
Indeed, the story of its founding could be read as a template by which all new eserler
are born in the GM: Gülen simply announced ‘it would be good if this could be done’,
and the wheels began to turn. As one of Hendrick’s contacts observed:
33  Hendrick, op. cit., 107.
34  İştar B. Gözaydın, ‘The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Politics in Turkey: A Chance for
Democratization or a Trojan Horse?’, Democratization 16, no. 6 (2009): 1214–1236.
35  Hendrick, 2013: 20.
36  Field interview, January 2014.
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Hocaefendi said it would be beneficial for them [GM-affiliated businessmen], for 
their future enterprises, and he asked them to pray. So people came together and it 
started [Bank Asya] in this way [. ..] But Hocaefendi does not have an account [at 
the bank].37
In  the  2000s,  a  new  set  of  mobilizing  institutions  were  developed—the  regional
business  organisations,  of  which  the  Turkish  Confederation  of  Businessmen  and
Industrialists (Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu, TUSKON) was the
best known. Founded through a merger of seven smaller business federations in 2005
and now shuttered by the Turkish state, TUSKON at its peak represented around 40,000
small and medium-sized enterprises around the world. 
Financing by way of himmet
The ethos of himmet [voluntary contributions] based on the Islamic tenet of charitable
giving form the well-spring of the GM’s pre-2016 financial operations. The financing of
these  projects  has  come  largely  from  these  voluntary  contributions,  made  by  the
hundreds of thousands of ‘ordinary’ followers, systematically instrumentalized over the
decades to construct the sprawling corporate network that underpins the movement. As
a  result,  a  highly  organized,  albeit  radically  decentralized,  fundraising  system  was
developed at the centre of Gülen’s powerful network. 
Indeed,  without  this  financial  dimension,  the  movement  would  have  been
nothing. As one of our interlocuters observed: ‘It doesn’t work without donations. It is
with donations that the wheels turn.’ Another noted, ‘The bitter truth is that not much
can be done without material resources. This is why the movement includes a voluntary-
based  economic  mind-set.’ 38 Cemal  Uşak,  former  president  of  the  now-shuttered
Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (Journalist and Writer’s Foundation, JWF) and one of the
movement’s most prominent public figures, confirmed the role that contributions have
made to the GM’s growth and development: ‘The main sources of this movement are
Qur’an, our prophet and then Mr. Gülen but that is not to say money is not important.
How else could have we opened up so many schools?’ 39
37  Cited in ibid., 168.
38  Field interview, November 2014.
39  Field interview, May 2012
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Members contribute what they can out of their own pocket, and the degree to
which they are close to  Gülen is  dependent  on the level  of their  contribution.  Less
prominent contributors (e.g. small traders or professional salary men) do not necessarily
expect  anything  direct  or  concrete  in  return,  and  simply  trust  that  their  funds  will
contribute to the network’s expansion and growth, for example by providing start-up
capital for a new venture. Yet, members are aware that their participation in the GM via
economic contributions may also yield new business opportunities. As one interviewee
noted, 
The main gain for me is spiritual. At the same time, of course, I have made friends 
from business circles through Hizmet’s network. We have seen opportunities 
opened up across the world outside Turkey. This has broadened our horizons both 
in terms of network and business. This was all because of Hizmet.40
For medium and larger-sized businessmen and merchants, tremendous material benefits
invariably  flowed  back  via  what  Joshua  Hendrick  has  labelled  the  movement’s
‘production  network’.41 By  this  he  means  the  extensive  web  of  GM-affiliated
manufacturers and traders that originally sprang up to supply Gülen-inspired schools
with equipment and sundries but who later came to act as ‘preferred suppliers’ to any
and every new project or initiative that develops across the movement. This network at
its  peak before 2013 covered almost  every sector in Turkey,  including construction,
finance, publishing, newspapers, and media, small electronics, fittings and furnishings,
and much more. As one member of Gülen’s inner circle told Hendrick in 2007:
If you are a businessman, you shall either sell something, or you offer a service. 
Out of [those] who will need your service, they will come to you first. Why? 
Because they know about your character! You are already two steps ahead of your 
competition with these people.42
Organizational morphology
How  precisely  were  these  mobilizing  institutions  and  practices  instrumentalized  in
Gülen’s ‘diaspora by design’ prior to 2016? We contend that Fethullah Gülen and his
40  Field interview, May 2012.
41  Hendrick, op. cit, 158–64.
42  Cited in ibid., 160.
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close circle crafted, from the late 1990s, a very distinctive organizational morphology to
do  so.  Although  this  structure  has  been  dramatically  reshaped—and  substantially
weakened—after July 2016 much of it remains and it is thus worth analysing, not least
because—as we noted in at the top of the article—where the movement has come from
offers some clues as to how it will evolve in the future.
Figure 1 presents an organizational chart detailing the structure of the GM prior
to the commencement of the crackdown on the movement in the second half of 2016. It
depicts the three core elements of the movement as it existed at that time—its ‘control
centre’  in  Pennsylvania  (still  intact),  the  civic  face  of  the  movement  (mostly  intact
outside Turkey, dismantled at home), and its ‘dark networks’ of influence in political
circles and in the state structure (now  largely extricated in waves of purges since July
2016). 
[Figure 1 about here]
Gülen and the Grand Council of Elders: The ‘control centre’ of the network
The control centre is the ‘heart’ and the ‘brains’ of the movement and is completely
hidden from public view. Since Gülen’s self-imposed exile to the United States in 1999,
the ‘control centre’ has been physically based in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania. The ‘inner
sanctum’, which comprises Gülen and the Grand Council of Elders, senior businessmen,
and the ‘Mullahs’ or religious/theological advisors, exemplifies the parapolitical precept
that  public  accountability  in  political  activity  must  be  consciously  diminished.  The
undisputed decision-making body within the network is the Council of Elders, chaired
by Gülen  himself.  It  typically  has  10–15 members  at  any one time  and consists  of
loyalists of long-standing hand-picked by Gülen, many of whom have been with him
since the beginning. Unwavering loyalty and demonstrated management and political
acumen are considered the key attributes for appointment to this body. 
The leaders  (CEOs,  board  members)  of  the  most  successful  business  groups
within the network (e.g. Koza İpek Grubu in Ankara, Dumankaya Grubu in Istanbul,
Boydak Holdings in Kayseri, and Kavuklar Holdings, in Izmir)43 were—prior to 2016—
43  The coup attempt and its aftershocks have affected the situations of these business groups’
owners.  Among them, Akın İpek, the head of Koza İpek Grubu has decamped from Turkey
and the  heads  of  Boydak  Holdings and Kavuklar  Holdings were  arrested on  charges  of
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a  second  element  of  the  movement’s  ‘inner  sanctum’.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the
collective action of these senior business figures was institutionalized in the 2000s in
the  form  of  business  organizations,  particularly  TUSKON.  This  group  might  have
comprised as many as 50 senior business figures, all of whom maintained a ‘direct line’
to Gülen. They would consult him on major business decisions, provide individual and
collective  financial  support,  and  would  be  available  for  advice,  consultation,  and
‘favours’.  The  sheer  size  of  the  businesses  made  these  men—and  the  coordinating
capacity of institutions like TUSKON—very powerful mobilizers within the GM. 
 The final component of the inner sanctum has been the ‘mullahs’, the select
group of followers who act as the primary spiritual intermediaries between Gülen and
the disparate members of the global community of men and women who follow him.44
As one interviewee noted ‘the mullahs are the spiritual representatives of Gülen in every
unit and thus their religion based precepts and advice are very valuable for us.’45
Recruitment and public relations: The ‘civic face’ of the movement
The associational element of the movement—its schools and study centres, think tanks
and dialogue centres, and its media outlets—is the part of the GM that has been most
‘visible’ to the public. Each institution or organization within the ‘civic face’ is itself the
product of some prior, politically-directed eser, which—as mentioned above—produced
the organic expansion in the movement over time.
supporting  the  Gülen  movement’s  illegal  activities.  Furthermore,  among  these  groups
Boydak Holdings assets  were transferred to  the  Deposit  Insurance Fund (TMSF) on the
grounds of alleged ties to the GM.
     For  details  see:  https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2016/09/05/gulen-linked-boydak-
holding-transferred-to-turkeys-regulator-body-tmsf
44  At the risk of stating the obvious, the Gülen network is made up of individuals who pursue a
deeply religious way of life. It is not surprising, therefore, that they seek spiritual guidance
— ‘practical theology’—in a variety of different aspects of their daily lives. This is, after all,
the core of the movement. While Gülen is the principal teacher and guide and the primary
conduit  of  all  the  teachings  within  the  neo-Nurcu  tradition,  ordinary  members  of  the
movement cannot contact him directly for advice or counsel. Access to his teachings and
guidance  is  provided  instead  through  the  appointment  of  religious  advisors  (‘mullahs’)
through key nodes in the network. They act therefore as ‘spiritual intermediaries’ between
Gülen and his sprawling network of followers. Gülen retains a direct link to the ‘mullahs’.
They are handpicked men who are typically graduates of İmam-Hatip schools in Turkey, and
who have pursued prior degrees from theology faculties. They spend between 12 and 48
months with Gülen, training, discussing, and mastering the works of Said Nursi before they
are deployed into key nodes of the network. 
45  Field interview, December 2013
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Every unit within the ‘civic face’ of the movement has served one of two core
functions:  recruitment  or public  relations.  First,  recruitment.  The private  educational
network has been crucial  here.  It was established as part of a long-term strategy by
Gülen to both bring spiritual renewal to Turkish society from the ‘bottom up’ and lay
the ground for the development of a new, powerful social and economic elite in Turkey,
capable  of  gradually  displacing  the  entrenched  secular  Kemalist  elites  from  their
bureaucratic, judicial and corporate industrial and media redoubts. As one interviewee
mentioned, ‘The students of today will become the governors, judges, administrators as
well as business people of the future. That is to say,  today’s businessmen and other
influential figures used to be simple students too.’46 As Findley, notes by ‘shaping the
students’  personhood  (kişilik)  an  identity  (kimlik),  the  goal  is  to  craft  a  golden
generation (altın nesil) of Turks who can be producers, not consumers, of modernity.’47
At the  same time,  the  preparatory  schools  served as  the  principal  means  to  recruit
students enrolled in the traditional bases of secular socialization—the elite lycees and
the  military  schools—by  providing  them  with  afterschool  and  weekend  Islamic
instruction and socialization into the movement, undetected.  In this way, the movement
could evade the military's robust filtering system, to enter and build networks within the
armed forces in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating most obviously in the abortive July
2016 putsch.
The second function of the ‘civic face’ of the movement is public relations. As
mentioned, Gülen has long been suspected of conspiracy in Turkey. As Hendrick notes:
‘Fears  about  ‘Fetullahcılar’  (Fethullahists)  infiltrating  Turkey’s  civilian  and military
bureaucracies in an effort to patiently “Islamicize” the secular republic are common.’48
For this reason, the movement has ‘become quite adept at anticipating [attacks] and thus
developed a sophisticated system of refutation and denial.’49 The JWF—now closed
down after the coup attempt—and the Turkish daily newspaper Zaman—taken over by
the state in March 2016—were critical here. Even though these institutions both had a
very  clear  and  distinct  institutional  existence  (separate  legal  status  and  governance
structures)  they were  as  close  to  and dependent  on Gülen  as  any other  part  of  the
46  Field interview, May 2015
47  Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity.
48  Hendrick, Gülen, 6.
49  Ibid., 7.
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network.  The  primary  purpose  of  these  outlets  has  been  to  publicize  the  positive
elements of the movement and to engage in protective ‘damage control’ whenever the
movement is imperilled. This often involves a proactive ‘counter-defamation’ strategy
of which many of the GM’s ‘insider’ scholars have been an integral part. This creates a
sort of back and forth between the movement and its critics, as Tittensor observes: 
[A] discourse has developed between the movements, its detractors and observers 
that can be described as a media merry-go-round; continual volleys of accusations 
are met by counter-accusations, but the questions about the Gülen movement are 
never really resolved.50 
For example, in the wake of the 2013 corruption investigations, Erdoğan’s government
discharged a great many police officers and arrested many of those with apparent ties to
the movement. Zaman and the entire transnational network of dialogue centres swung in
to  action  to  defend the  movement  in  the  global  public  sphere.  Prominent  members
abroad  were  dispatched  to  lobby  politicians,  journalists  and  public  figures  and  to
organize conferences to lay out the Gülenist line on the corruption allegations and to
emphasize  the  increasing  authoritarian  bent  of  Erdoğan’s  government.  As  one
interviewee noted in the wake of the corruption probe, ‘we have to explain to the whole
world clearly what is going on in Turkey right now, otherwise our international ties will
break as time goes on.’51 
The ‘dark network’ within the Turkish state structure
Parapolitics is always associated with covert action and subterfuge, typically relying, as
Scott reminds us, on ‘political exploitation of […] parastructures, such as intelligence
agencies’ or other coercive arms of the state.52  What we are calling Gülen’s erstwhile
‘dark network’ of influence within the Turkish state structure (figure 1) reflected this
dimension of the parapolitical within the movement. Gülen has long been suspected of
seeking to infiltrate the state structure, and this ambition has been one of the key reasons
the  organization  has  come  under  attack  in  Turkey and abroad.53 Graham E.  Fuller,
50  Tittensor,  Secret Agenda’, p. 166.
51  Field interview, March 2016
52  Scott, op. cit. 238.
53  Tittensor, ‘Secret Agenda’.
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former vice-chairman of the US National Intelligence Council,  for example,  claimed
almost a decade ago that Gülenists have become deeply entrenched in the police and
intelligence  services.54  Indeed,  as  Yavuz noted  in  his  2003 book,  Islamic  Political
Identity in Turkey,  ‘Gülen has not hidden his cooperation with the State Intelligence
Service’.55
A now infamous sermon delivered via cassette tape in the 1980s has long been
seen as the ‘smoking gun’ pointing to Gülen’s ambitions to surreptitiously capture the
Turkish state by infiltrating it:
You must move in the arteries of the system, without anyone noticing your 
existence, until you reach all the power centers […] You must wait until such time 
as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the 
power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey […] Until that time, any step 
taken would be too early—like breaking an egg without waiting the full forty days 
for it to hatch. It would be like killing the chick inside. The work to be done is [in] 
confronting the world. Now, I have expressed my feelings and thoughts to you all
—in confidence […] trusting your loyalty and sensitivity to secrecy. I know that 
when you leave here—[just] as you discard your empty juice boxes, you must 
discard the thoughts and feelings expressed here.56
The AKP–GM ‘marriage of convenience’, formed after the AKP first came to power,
accelerated this process. As Yavuz and Koç note: 
[From 2002] then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed followers of 
Fethullah Gülen to key government positions. This administrative support from the
Gülen movement enabled the AKP to govern the country and closely monitor the 
military with the help of the police force.57
Forming  an  alliance  with  Gülen  was,  as  Yavuz and Koç observe,  ‘Erdoğan’s  most
effective strategy [as it] included well-trained, educated and competent bureaucrats who
54  Graham E Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008).
55  Yavuz, 2003: 213
56  Cited in Yavuz and Koç, ‘The Turkish Coup Attempt: The Gülen Movement vs. the State’,
p. 138.
57  Ibid., p. 136.
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would  control  state  institutions  while  working  with  Erdoğan  to  transform  them.’58
Despite  the  distinct  differences  in  their  backgrounds  this  alliance  was  strong,
particularly in the 2002–07 period. 
Our  interviews  confirm  that  an  extensive  network  of  Gülen-linked  officials
within the Turkish state structure was well-advanced by the time of the December 2013
corruption probe crisis, especially in critical  positions such the head of the Supreme
Board of Judges and Prosecutors and the commissioner of police. As a member very
close to Gülen told us: 
Of course, we have many friends in the state. We have friends who are tied to us at 
many levels. Most of them are our old students but only seniors and Hocaefendi 
know precisely where these people are placed. There are absolutely people within 
the state who have visited Hocaefendi and follow his guidance and advice.59
The purpose of  these  placeholders  was  to  give  effect  to  Gülen’s  ‘guidance’  and to
protect and promote other Gülenists in the state structure. As figure 1 shows, the lines of
command and appointment  between Gülen and the Council  of  Elders  and networks
within the state was—before the post-coup purges—direct and unmediated. At the same
time, Gülenist appointments had the explicit purpose of displacing Kemalists, who have
traditionally dominated the bureaucracy, as well as senior officials from other groups
within the broader Turkish Islamist movement.
Additionally, Gülen sought indirect influence in Turkey’s wider political circles,
mostly comprising government officials and elected law makers. Before the corruption
probe brought the AKP–Gülen ‘marriage of convenience’ to a very public end in 2013–
14, AKP government officials would visit Gülen in Pennsylvania almost as a matter of
course. This constant traffic between Gülen and leading AKP figures—such as Bülent
Arınç, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Cemil Çiçek—was part and parcel of network governance
in  Turkey.  These  invitations  and  subsequent  meetings  were  frequently  very  public
(often  garnering  front  page  headlines  in  Turkish  newspapers)  and encouraged  more
junior ministers and members of parliament to reach out to Gülen. With these visits,
Gülen would take the opportunity to influence political circles, for example, by leaning
58  Ibid.
59  Field interview, April 2014
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on a minister to appoint a Gülenist to a senior administrative position. For instance, as
one interviewee noted: 
We never mention political issues in our inner circle. But, of course there are our 
people (brothers) who are also involved with these issues. It is also known that 
Hocaefendi is visited by many Turkish and foreign politicians every year. He 
naturally gives them advice and guidance and I personally know that they follow 
his advice.60 
At  the  same  time,  the  ‘civil  face’  of  the  movement  was  also  deeply  connected  to
political circles via relations of informal exchange and consultation. AKP ministers or
other high party officials were regularly invited as keynote speaker at the opening of a
dialogue centre or new campus of an educational institution and at ceremonies hosted
by the  Zaman newspaper.  For  example,  current  prime  minister  Binali  Yıldırım was
keynote  speaker  at  the  2013  Turkish  Language  Olympics  organized  by  the  Gülen
movement and in 2012 AKP grandee Cemil Çiçek headlined the Gülen-inspired Abant
Meeting on the theme of the new Turkish constitution.
Command and control
As  far  as  the  movement’s  ‘dark  network’  in  the  state  structure  is  concerned,  as
mentioned the lines between Gülen and his appointees was covert, direct and closely
held.  However,  as mentioned relations in the broader network were—and still  are—
diffuse and ambiguous. A question therefore arises as to how Gülen has managed to
exert  control  over  such  a  sprawling  network.  We  identify  two  types  of  command
structures that have been set up organically over time to facilitate such control and that
in many parts of the world survive intact.  The first is what we label the ‘functional
command  structure’.  At  its  heart  are  senior  Gülen  loyalists  who  have  developed  a
lifetime’s  technical  expertise  in  a  particular  aspect  of  the  network,  be  it  business,
education, media, or philanthropy. We refer to these men and—in a novel development
in  some  cases  now  women61—as  ‘functional’  imams  or  ağabeys  [literally  ‘older
brother’, but in this context ‘chief’].  Originally drawn from the first generation who
60  Field interview, June 2014
61  Throughout our final interview process after the failed coup attempt, we have learned that in
some locations women have started to manage the organisational structures. This is very new
for the Gülen Movement’s management mentality and it is still very rare. 
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studied with Gülen in the early 1970s, but more recently from a newer generation raised
in  the  movement  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,62 Gülen’s  ‘charismatic  aristocracy’  as
Hendrick refers to them,63 have been the key nodes in the network; each retains a direct
link to Gülen.
Perhaps the best example of a functional ağabey of the new generation is Ekrem
Dumanlı, a former editor-in-chief of Zaman (2001–15). Dumanlı would travel regularly
to  Pennsylvania  to  seek  Gülen’s  counsel  and  return  to  Turkey  and  recalibrate  the
editorial policy of the paper per Gülen’s wishes. As one interviewee noted:
After the visits of Ekrem ağabey to Hocaefendi, he had more clear ideas about the 
general policy of the newspaper and he started to move according the general 
advice of Gülen; in my personal view this is very normal since we are a community
and our leader is Hocaefendi.64 
The former head of TUSKON, Rıza Nur Meral—who is now awaiting trial on charges
of financially supporting terrorism65—was also a trusted functional  ağabey of the new
generation. Yet another example is Mustafa Yeşil, former head of the JWF. He would
also travel to Pennsylvania regularly and recounts how Gülen would give him explicit,
but general, instructions specifically related to public conferences, events, and meetings
within important institution. Gülen would stipulate the strategic purpose of these events,
leaving the tactical and administrative logistics to the trusted ağabey, whose expertise
would be brought to bear to ensure the success of these initiatives.66 For example, Gülen
would never specifically determinate who should be invited or the order of speaking.
These decisions would be left for the functional ağabeys to determine based on their
62  Yavuz, 2013: 86.
63  Hendrick, 2013: 79, 99-100.
64  Field interview, January 2015
65  https://www.haberler.com/tuskon-davasi-sanik-savunmalariyla-devam-ediyor-10311514-
haberi/
66  The well-known ‘Abant Meetings’ are a good case in point. Gülen had determined that these
meetings would be established from 1998 to facilitate dialogue and establish a strategic link
at  the  global  level  between  the  movement  and  certain  sectors.  Specifically,  the  ‘right’
individuals would be chosen to participate, such that  the final  mix of participants would
allow for the appearance of pluralism and at the same time ensuring no particularly ‘critical’
or ‘dangerous’ voices would be present. Gülen’s ‘distance’ from these meetings comports
with  Hendrick’s  extensive  discussion  of  the  ‘strategic  ambiguity’  of  the  movement  and
Gülen’s leadership in particular.  
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own  expertise  and  professional  networks.  At  the  same  time,  the  broad  strategic
parameters were undoubtedly the work of Gülen.
Territorial command structure
The  ‘control  centre’  has  also  employed  a  second  form—what  we  refer  to  as  the
‘territorial  command  structure’—to  exert  its  power.  The  transnational  territorial
command  structure  built  on  the  control  model  developed  in  Turkey  prior  to  the
movement’s  expansion in  the mid-1990s,  but  also refined it  in  the process.  To wit,
Gülen’s followers evolved a complex command structure based on the twin pillars of
mütevelli heyeti [management committees] and what we refer to as ‘territorial’ imams or
ağabeys. 
It  bears  repeating  that,  while  the  network  overall has  lacked  hierarchical
structure—a point also made by Hendrick in his discussion of ‘strategic ambiguity’ as
an  organizational  strategy—within  individual  elements  of  the  network,  hierarchical
command is very much a practical concern. In this sense, hierarchy matters, although in
a very subtle and subterranean fashion. This is particularly true of the GM’s territorial
command structure. At the apex are regional ağabeys who cover an entire international
region (e.g. Continental Europe, North America, Southeast Asia). These regional imams
are understood by all within that territory as the direct representative of Gülen and are
acknowledged by all as acting on his behalf. As one interviewee noted, ‘So, can there be
a unit without some kind of administration? Of course not! This is why every unit needs
to have a big brother who is in charge and this is what provides order.’67   
As  mentioned,  all  members  of  the  cemaat have  been  expected  to  follow  a
vocation  that  takes  the  journey  of  the  Prophet  Mohammed  and  his  followers  as
inspiration. Gülen’s philosophy is that, much like the Prophet, leaders remain spiritually
and managerially vital if they are constantly moving and tested by new experiences and
new challenges. Accordingly, regional ağabeys traditionally remained in one place for a
maximum of four years and were in constant dialogue with the Council of Elders about
the development of human capital in their region before they would move on to a new
(and presumably more challenging) assignment. 
67  Field interview, March 2015
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Regional imams work closely with the local  mütevelli heyeti, which has been
responsible for the administration of existing eserler and the launching of new ones. It
is worth briefly detail an example of how the territorial structure and mütevelli heyeti
would mobilized to initiate a new eser outside Turkey. Gülen and the Council of Elders
would determine that a new school or dialogue should be opened in, say, Myanmar. The
regional ağabey (in this case for Southeast Asia, headquartered in Bangkok, Thailand)
and local mütevelli heyeti would receive ‘guidance’ from Gülen and would assess their
capacity  to  initiate  the project.  If  insufficient  start-up capital  could not be found in
Bangkok, an appropriately sized local sub-country level mütevelli heyeti inside Turkey
(that of, say, Gaziantep) would be mobilized to raise the funds. This then would become
a joint-venture between the Bangkok and Gaziantep ağabeys and mütevelli. In this way,
local  efforts  in  Myanmar  would  be fully  supported  until  that  country’s  ağabey and
mütevelli could stand on its own two feet financially and organizationally. This, then, is
how the GM has expanded both in Turkey and globally since the 1980s. 
(3) Conclusion: The future of the Gülen movement in transnational 
political exile
At the very beginning of 2018 we had an opportunity to talk to a former senior member
of the defunct JWF, who sought political asylum in Stockholm after June 2016. In our
conversation, we asked him to reflect on the fate of the organisational structure of the
GM  in  the  wake  of  recent  events.  His  answer  was  quite  an  indicator  of  the
transformation of the movement in exile:
This is a very good question indeed. If I say to you that, yes, everything has been 
proceeding as it had been [before the crackdown], that would be a lie. There are 
now many issues regarding economic resources and connections among our 
friends. First, we have lost our economic power and therefore some of the areas 
cannot supply minimum necessities. Our friends have dispersed to different 
countries and most of them in Turkey are in prison. So, it is impossible to keep the 
organisational system and discipline the same as it was. But, the organisational 
system has not collapsed totally; I believe that Hizmet will adapt itself to these new
conditions and become more localized in every single country.68
68  Failed interview, February 2018. 
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At the same time, it points to our core conviction that coming to grips with where the
movement  is  headed  needs  a  clear  understanding  of  where  it  has  come  from.  We
conclude, then, by briefly laying out a framework for thinking about how the movement
may evolve in future as it transitions to a fragmented community in transnational in
political exile.
As this is an exilic diaspora in the making, it makes sense to frame this putative
social formation in the terms we laid out at the top of the article: as a  transnational
imagined  community  whose  evolution  will  be  structured  by  opportunity  structures,
ideational frames, and mobilizing institutions and practices. The first, if obvious, point
to make is that what we have witnessed since at least 2015 is the transportation of a
domestic  political  conflict  into transnational  space.  The Turkish state  has  sought  to
replicate  the  crackdown at  home abroad.  However,  as  Elise  Féron and others  have
observed, the conflict in countries of settlement does not simply reproduce the home
conflict  but is impacted by variation in transnational space of the nature of the host
countries and patterns of migration.69
This  focus  on  conflict  autonomization  points  to  the  first  element  in  the
framework: the role of political opportunity structures. As scholars of political exile and
conflict-generated diasporas have noted, the patterns in which conflicts are transported
from the home country into transnational space are highly dependent on conditions in
countries of settlement. As Shain observes, ‘The destination of political exile is always
a great factor in determining not only the character of the exiles' struggle from abroad
but also their political and cultural outlook’.70 
We  contend  that  in  those  countries  with  more  open  politics  and  with  less
dependence on Turkey as far as foreign policy is concerned, the GM will have more
opportunity to flourish. We see this playing out today in the core nodes in which the
network is stable: the United States, Australia,  the UK, and Sweden. In a sense, we
expect to see the Gülen movement adopting a stance in exile not too dissimilar to that of
69  See Élise Féron, “Transporting and Re-Inventing Conflicts: Conflict-Generated Diasporas
and  Conflict  Autonomisation,”  Cooperation  and  Conflict  52,  no.  3  (2017):  360–376;
Sökefeld, op. cit., Bahar Baser, “Gezi Spirit in the Diaspora: Diffusion of Turkish Politics to
Europe,” in Everywhere Taksim: Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi, ed. Kumru F.
Toktamış and Isabel David (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 251–66.
70  Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation-State (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), p. xxiv.
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the  Cuban  diaspora  in  the  United  states,  namely  ‘a  mixing  of  exile  politics  (i.e.,
opposition  from  abroad)  with  “transnational”  economic  and  political  lobbying  of
“normalized” diasporas.’71 That it is doing so primarily from Western countries, and—
notably—from  Sweden,  where  Turkish  diasporic  political  activism  has  long  been
welcomed, is testament to the variation in political opportunities mentioned above.72
This  points  to  the  second  element  in  the  frame,  ideational  and  mobilizing
structures. As far as these are concerned, Gulen movement public outreach and media
enterprises are ‘playing to their strengths’ in using the network’s long-established PR
skills and cultural diplomacy efforts to both lobby host publics and governments and
launch a coordinated campaign of opposition to President Erdoğan and the ruling AKP
government  in Turkey.  Interestingly,  at  the macro  level  there has been a subtle  but
noticeable  shift  in  framing.  This  is  arguably  best  exemplified  by  the  ‘research  and
publishing’ strategy of the GM’s Stockholm Center for Freedom, based in Sweden. The
structure  of  the  Center’s  website  reflects  a  discursive  ‘turn’  from  the  GM’s  long-
standing focus on interfaith dialogue and peace to new frames of ‘hate speech’, ‘press
freedom’,  and  reporting  on  ‘torture’  and  ‘persecution’.  Here,  again  we  see  the
adaptability of the movement as it coopts the language of Western anti-authoritarianism
and  political  and civil  rights,  arguably  to  leverage  the  current  tensions  in  relations
between Turkey and the West.
At the same time, at the micro level there is evidence that ‘ordinary’  cemaat
members are turning to a renewed emphasis on their religious faith in mobilizing to
overcome  the  crisis,  Dumovich  observes.  As  she  notes,  ‘The  ubiquitous  narrative
among my interlocutors is that “Everything we are going through now happened to our
Prophet, it happened to many prophets in the history of mankind. There is no problem,
we know we are in the righteous path, and that is all that matters”.’73
Finally,  we  turn  to  mobilizing  institutions  and  practices.  The  old  model  of
71  Shain, op. cit., p. xvii.
72  In the USA, the GM website ‘Hizmet News’ serves this function, whereas in Sweden the
very active ‘Stockholm Center for Freedom’ is at  the forefront of  efforts  to recruit  non-
members to contribute to the Center’s ‘research and publishing’ efforts, a classic movement
practice.
73  Liza Dumovich, ‘Pious Creativity: Negotiating Hizmet in South America after July 2016’,
Politics, Religion & Ideology (forthcoming), p. 21.
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transnational corporate growth through eserler has been undermined by the crackdown
in  Turkey and the  sapping of  financial  resources  in  Turkey.  The  Turkish  state  has
shuttered all Gulen schools and taken over its media and business enterprises, all in all
absorbing more than US$13 billion worth of GM assets in Turkey, approximately half
of the global value of the network.74 In its wake, Gülenists are having to do more with
less. As, as Clifford asserts, for the GM this means ‘decentred, lateral spaces’ are likely
to be as important ‘as those ‘formed around a teleology of origin/return.’75
As schools have been at the heart of the movement, efforts have been made to
close them across the globe.76 This has been resisted in many places, however this does
not mean that existing arrangements have remained in place. In Cambodia, for example,
while  the  two  educational  outfits  of  the  GM—Zaman  University  and  the  Zaman
International School—were not transferred to the Turkish state they were taken over by
local actors close to the Cambodian government, presumably with either a dilution or
ending of GM control.77 
Moreover, the movement is establishing new projects, particularly in the online
advocacy space. Here, again, the movement is being less than transparent and rather
evasive. But—true to form—the establishment of online sites such as turkeypurge.com
and  the  Stockholm Center  for  Freedom—which  deliberately  coopt  the  language  of
Western  human  rights  discourse  and  anti-authoritarianism  of  organizations  like
Amnesty  International—reflect  the  movement’s  long-standing  habit  of  seeking
‘legitimation by association’.78
Since  2013,  when  the  AKP–Gülen  split  burst  into  the  open,  the  political
74  Anthony Skinner, ‘Turkish business suffers under Erdogan's post-coup Gulen purge’ CNBC
News  (online),  7  November  2016,  https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/07/turkish-business-
suffers-under-erdogans-post-coup-gulen-purge.html
75  James  Clifford,  “Diasporas,”  Cultural  Anthropology 9,  no.  3  (August  1994):  302–38,
https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1994.9.3.02a00040, pp. 305–06.
76  See Angey, op. cit.; Paul Alexander, ‘Turkey on Diplomatic Push to Close Schools Linked
to  Influential  Cleric’,  Voice  of  America,  1  September  2017,
https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-erdogan-gulen-schools/4010073.html 
77  Chanbota  Chorn,  ‘Turkey's  Anti-Gulen  Purge  Hits  Respected  International  School  in
Cambodia’, Voice of America, 3  August  2016,  https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-
anti-gulen-purge-hits-respected-international-school-in-cambodia/3447722.html
78  See Caroline Tee, ‘The Gülen Movement in London and the Politics of Public Engagement:
Producing  'Good  Islam'  Before  and  After  July  15th’,  Religion,  Politics  &  Ideology
(forthcoming).
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ambitions  of  Fethullah  Gülen  have  been  thrown in  to  sharp  relief.  This  article  has
attempted  to  shed  much-needed  light  on  the  inner  workings  of  Gülen’s  sprawling
network  through  an  analysis  of  the  GM’s  pre-2016  financial  operations  and
organizational structure. In so doing, we have advanced the core claim that the GM was
neither a high-minded voluntarist civic movement nor a ‘terrorist network’ or a ‘parallel
structure’ within the Turkish state. Rather, we have argued that it is best conceived as a
transnational parapolitical organization dedicated to the pursuit of power. In pursuing
this claim through a comprehensive, rigorous, theoretically-informed but empirically-
grounded analysis, we hope to have avoided many of the ideological traps that existing
research has often fallen into.
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Table 1. Breakdown of interviewees.




Country imams/ağabeys     7 UK, Spain, Austria, 
Slovenia, Hungary, 
Thailand, Italy
Sub-national imams/ağabeys 4 Southeast England, 
Catalonia, Western 
Germany, Northern Italy
Journalists, including senior members 
of
the Writers’ and Journalists’ Foundation
23 Turkey and other countries
University personnel, including senior
administrators and senior academics
(Assistant professor and above)
8 Turkey and other countries
Mullahs (Spiritual/theological advisors) 2 Turkey and other countries
Senior dialogue personnel 6 Turkey and other countries
Business owners/entrepreneurs 18 Turkey and other countries
Students 11 Turkey and other countries
Total 79
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